Is there a better way to screen airline passengers?

scannedIf you look enviously at the TSA Pre-Check line whenever you’re at the airport — where pre-cleared air travelers breeze through the checkpoint without having to be scanned, remove their shoes or face a humiliating “enhanced” pat-down — then join the club.

If you ask yourself: “What sets them apart from me?” and the answer is, “Nothing, really,” then you’re well on your way to answering a question that has haunted aviation security professionals since 2009.

Is there a better way to screen air travelers than scanning them?

Some say there isn’t, and they’ll insist that shooting X-rays or microwaves at your body is the only way to be absolutely sure you’re not packing a gun or carrying explosives. But many of these “experts” have ulterior motives, because they happen to also work for the manufacturers of X-ray and millimeter wave technology.

Of course they want more machines. Their livelihoods depend on it.

But a hard look at the facts says otherwise. The scanners haven’t foiled a single terrorist attack. In fact, their vulnerabilities are so well-known to the bad guys they would probably prefer a scan over a pat-down on their way to their terrorist mission, assuming they can’t secure Pre-Check clearances. The machines have an obvious, and unfortunate, blind spot.

Gold standards?

A few weeks ago, TSA Administrator John Pistole proclaimed that American aviation security was the gold standard. This didn’t sit well with the Israelis, who have long considered themselves to be the standard-bearer when it comes to aviation security. But the administrator can be forgiven for engaging in a little hyperbole; after all, he needs to raise employee morale at his $8 billion-a-year agency, which isn’t exactly known for its happy workforce.

But a look at the real gold standard in aviation security — yep, that would be Israel — suggests full-body scanners may be worthless. Israel doesn’t use them at all. A manager told Canadian officials in 2010 that the scanners were easily fooled, which is why Israel didn’t rely on them. Although some scanners have been tested in Israel since then, security officials continue to refuse to use the machines as a primary method of screening.
A look at what the real experts are doing seems to suggest that the answer to the question, “Is there a better way?” is: absolutely.

A different scanner

One solution is to switch scanners. For the last few weeks, the folks who are developing a new kind of technology have been sending me information about their product. Iscon’s Thermo-Conductive Mini-Portal Scanner promises a way to screen passengers without using radiation or creating a revealing image.

Instead of firing X-rays at passengers, this infrared body scanner detects hidden objects without penetrating clothing or making physical contact, according to the manufacturer. It recently completed tests at Bristol Airport in the U.K., where it “performed well,” according to the company.

Certainly, the thought of waving an infrared scanner in front of passengers instead of bombarding them with radiation is enough for the TSA’s critics to sit up and take notice. But the best scanner, they contend, is no scanner.

Time to remove the scanners?

The TSA is furiously backpedaling from its “one size fits all” solution to aviation security. It started by giving dignitaries and certain members of law enforcement a pass on the full-body scanners. Then came active-duty military and crewmembers. Next, it was elite-level frequent fliers and people who had undergone a background check. Now it’s testing a managed inclusion program that would open the scannerless Pre-Check lines to anyone who has been cleared by a bomb-sniffing dog.

If those tests are successful, then I wonder — who’s left?

We’re just a few short years, and perhaps months, away from admitting that the scanners and the punitive pat-downs that air travelers receive when they refuse to submit to a potentially dangerous scan, do not work.

Let’s get a move on.

Should the TSA abandon its body scanners?

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  • TSAisTerrorism

    Oh, please. It is so easy to get things past the TSA it isn’t even funny.

    With their vaunted 20 layers of security baklava, TSA has created a circus. And do you know what happens in a circus? Low level people are easily distracted.

    And voila! TSA has made air travel less safe by their very existence.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Oh, please. It is so easy to get things past the TSA it isn’t even funny.

    With their vaunted 20 layers of security baklava, TSA has created a circus. And do you know what happens in a circus? Low level people are easily distracted.

    And voila! TSA has made air travel less safe by their very existence.

  • cahdot

    so who gets the lawsuits when the tsa workers and passengers get cancer from the so called safe scanners???

  • cahdot

    so who gets the lawsuits when the tsa workers and passengers get cancer from the so called safe scanners???

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Your English lesson is cute.

    I’ll take your “article written in the past tense, and we therefore must presume that it is being done because TSA didn’t say it wasn’t” and raise you a cold dose of reality.

    I’m in airline corporate middle management. My SO is, as well, in a different arena. We therefore actually KNOW what’s going on, in and around planes better than making assumptions on what is not said. You’d be shocked to learn, I’m certain, that you are wrong.

    How does it feel to learn that you are sitting on a plane, blissfully unaware of the potential cargo bombs under your feet and flying over your head having just had your testicles fondled for freedom?

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Your English lesson is cute.

    I’ll take your “article written in the past tense, and we therefore must presume that it is being done because TSA didn’t say it wasn’t” and raise you a cold dose of reality.

    I’m in airline corporate middle management. My SO is, as well, in a different arena. We therefore actually KNOW what’s going on, in and around planes better than making assumptions on what is not said. You’d be shocked to learn, I’m certain, that you are wrong.

    How does it feel to learn that you are sitting on a plane, blissfully unaware of the potential cargo bombs under your feet and flying over your head having just had your testicles fondled for freedom?

  • TSAisTerrorism

    It’s not just DFW.

    At the world’s busiest airport, employees are never, ever screened. Ever.

    That’s how guns end up on planes.

    oops.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    It’s not just DFW.

    At the world’s busiest airport, employees are never, ever screened. Ever.

    That’s how guns end up on planes.

    oops.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Yeah, so that dude? He connected through AMS where they use these awesome new scanners you love. He presumably went through one. And then boarded a plane and tried to ignite his bomb. That is a very effective deterrent, indeed. Pathetic.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Yeah, so that dude? He connected through AMS where they use these awesome new scanners you love. He presumably went through one. And then boarded a plane and tried to ignite his bomb. That is a very effective deterrent, indeed. Pathetic.

  • SoBeSparky

    Once more, you want to rephrase an argument, put words in my mouth, create a straw dog and knock it down. Can’t you people demonstrate a grasp of facts rather than telling me you KNOW what is going on.

    If you KNOW that, I suggest you testify before Congress as your moral responsibility. If anyone should die after having their testicles fondled for freedom, their souls rest on your conscience.

  • SoBeSparky

    Once more, you want to rephrase an argument, put words in my mouth, create a straw dog and knock it down. Can’t you people demonstrate a grasp of facts rather than telling me you KNOW what is going on.

    If you KNOW that, I suggest you testify before Congress as your moral responsibility. If anyone should die after having their testicles fondled for freedom, their souls rest on your conscience.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Have you not been paying attention?

    Congress isn’t all that interested, and TSA obfuscates the issue. Some of us have tried, but thank you for letting me know what my civic duty should be.

    And there was no “rephrasing an argument” or “put[ting] words in your mouth.” Here is your direct quote:

    “In English we have the present tense and the past tense. Check your tenses. Your quotes are in the past tense, referring, to prior activities. My quote from the same article is in the present tense. This refers to today, not yesterday.”

    Are you, or are you not, arguing that TSA is now screening cargo because they no longer say they don’t? Because that’s exactly what it sounds like here, when you write:

    “Again, please read complete article including sentence in last paragraph: ‘Since the deadline has passed, TSA is now presumably enforcing the mandate, and all air cargo from abroad is being screened in full.’”

    But alas, you’re cool with it because you’ve seen your own luggage get screened and received little notes about it later. Wonder of wonders.

    We aren’t talking about your luggage. We’re talking about the UNSCREENED CARGO under your feet.

    That isn’t a straw man, that’s a cold hard fact.

    In English we use simple words to describe the need to believe aviation security is working because we’ve seen our own luggage screened and have not read words that say it isn’t. It’s called ignorance. And ignorance, apparently, is bliss.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    Have you not been paying attention?

    Congress isn’t all that interested, and TSA obfuscates the issue. Some of us have tried, but thank you for letting me know what my civic duty should be.

    And there was no “rephrasing an argument” or “put[ting] words in your mouth.” Here is your direct quote:

    “In English we have the present tense and the past tense. Check your tenses. Your quotes are in the past tense, referring, to prior activities. My quote from the same article is in the present tense. This refers to today, not yesterday.”

    Are you, or are you not, arguing that TSA is now screening cargo because they no longer say they don’t? Because that’s exactly what it sounds like here, when you write:

    “Again, please read complete article including sentence in last paragraph: ‘Since the deadline has passed, TSA is now presumably enforcing the mandate, and all air cargo from abroad is being screened in full.’”

    But alas, you’re cool with it because you’ve seen your own luggage get screened and received little notes about it later. Wonder of wonders.

    We aren’t talking about your luggage. We’re talking about the UNSCREENED CARGO under your feet.

    That isn’t a straw man, that’s a cold hard fact.

    In English we use simple words to describe the need to believe aviation security is working because we’ve seen our own luggage screened and have not read words that say it isn’t. It’s called ignorance. And ignorance, apparently, is bliss.

  • SoBeSparky

    I clearly differentiated between cargo and luggage in responses to various posts on each specific topic. You conflated the issues.

    Your civic responsibility, because you are in the KNOW, is to write and testify, not give reasons presumably absolving you of moral responsibility for KNOWing these aircraft are filled with unscreened cargo under the passengers’ feet.

    You are no better than a bystander watching a violent crime take place and then walking away, blaming the police for not caring. Stand up and be counted for what you KNOW.

    Just like all conspiracy theorists, you KNOW the information, which invariably is a state secret, and yet no one pays attention. “They” are all part of this cover-up. Sexual predators, oncologists, scan-machine manufacturers, universal-ID-card advocates and terrorists are combined to destroy America from within via the TSA, and no one will listen! Only you can save us, and yet you are silent!

  • SoBeSparky

    I clearly differentiated between cargo and luggage in responses to various posts on each specific topic. You conflated the issues.

    Your civic responsibility, because you are in the KNOW, is to write and testify, not give reasons presumably absolving you of moral responsibility for KNOWing these aircraft are filled with unscreened cargo under the passengers’ feet.

    You are no better than a bystander watching a violent crime take place and then walking away, blaming the police for not caring. Stand up and be counted for what you KNOW.

    Just like all conspiracy theorists, you KNOW the information, which invariably is a state secret, and yet no one pays attention. “They” are all part of this cover-up. Sexual predators, oncologists, scan-machine manufacturers, universal-ID-card advocates and terrorists are combined to destroy America from within via the TSA, and no one will listen! Only you can save us, and yet you are silent!

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    I thought it might helpful to provide a definition for a couple of words in Deborah’s excellent comment: “tone” and “Tone Troll.” Here’s the definition from the Urban Dictionary:

    “A tone troll is an internet troll who will effectively disrupt an internet discussion, because they feel that some of the participants are being too harsh, condescending, or use foul language. They often complain loudly and target specific subjects, even though they may actually agree with their subjects’ point of view.
    Tone trolls often emerge in the comments sections of the Pharyngula blog by Prof. PZ Myers.”

    http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Tone%20troll

    And here’s the definition from Pharyngula:

    “A tone troll is a serious-minded person who wants only to raise the level of discussion in the dire cesspits of the New Atheist web. Or, possibly, they’re a pompous blowhard who, lacking such frivolous accoutrements as an actual argument, attempts to distract attention from said deficit by complaining that their opposition uses dirty words and ought, really, to have some strict nanny figure—possibly Mary Poppins—to wash out their mouths with soap.

    Note that the presence of actual ‘dirty words’ in the traditional sense (notwithstanding that this is not uncommon on Pharyngula) isn’t particularly necessary for the use of this gambit. It is also acceptable to complain your opposition is being shrill.

    When people finally tell the tone troll to go away, it will sometimes accuse them of “kafkatrapping,” which means being so mean as not to bother explaining to an idiot why they’re an idiot in simple enough terms for the idiot to want to understand.”
    http://pharyngula.wikia.com/wiki/Tone_troll

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    I thought it might helpful to provide a definition for a couple of words in Deborah’s excellent comment: “tone” and “Tone Troll.” Here’s the definition from the Urban Dictionary:

    “A tone troll is an internet troll who will effectively disrupt an internet discussion, because they feel that some of the participants are being too harsh, condescending, or use foul language. They often complain loudly and target specific subjects, even though they may actually agree with their subjects’ point of view.
    Tone trolls often emerge in the comments sections of the Pharyngula blog by Prof. PZ Myers.”

    http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Tone%20troll

    And here’s the definition from Pharyngula:

    “A tone troll is a serious-minded person who wants only to raise the level of discussion in the dire cesspits of the New Atheist web. Or, possibly, they’re a pompous blowhard who, lacking such frivolous accoutrements as an actual argument, attempts to distract attention from said deficit by complaining that their opposition uses dirty words and ought, really, to have some strict nanny figure—possibly Mary Poppins—to wash out their mouths with soap.

    Note that the presence of actual ‘dirty words’ in the traditional sense (notwithstanding that this is not uncommon on Pharyngula) isn’t particularly necessary for the use of this gambit. It is also acceptable to complain your opposition is being shrill.

    When people finally tell the tone troll to go away, it will sometimes accuse them of “kafkatrapping,” which means being so mean as not to bother explaining to an idiot why they’re an idiot in simple enough terms for the idiot to want to understand.”
    http://pharyngula.wikia.com/wiki/Tone_troll

  • Susan Richart

    Interesting info, Lisa. Thanks.

    To further enlighten myself, I looked for a definition of “tone argument” and found this at the link below:

    “The tone argument is where you object to someone else’s argument based on its tone: it is too angry, too hateful, not calm enough, not nice enough, etc.”

    The paragraph continues: “It is a logical fallacy because none of those things has anything to do with whether the truth was spoken. It is used to derail and silence.”

    http://abagond.wordpress.com/2010/07/24/the-tone-argument

    I am not certain that one really has to be a troll to make a tone argument as I know several people who can’t deal with confrontation, even on the internet but they certainly are not trolls like the one we ran into the other day.

    BTW, I note that he is doing the same thing in another thread. :-)

  • Susan Richart

    Interesting info, Lisa. Thanks.

    To further enlighten myself, I looked for a definition of “tone argument” and found this at the link below:

    “The tone argument is where you object to someone else’s argument based on its tone: it is too angry, too hateful, not calm enough, not nice enough, etc.”

    The paragraph continues: “It is a logical fallacy because none of those things has anything to do with whether the truth was spoken. It is used to derail and silence.”

    http://abagond.wordpress.com/2010/07/24/the-tone-argument

    I am not certain that one really has to be a troll to make a tone argument as I know several people who can’t deal with confrontation, even on the internet but they certainly are not trolls like the one we ran into the other day.

    BTW, I note that he is doing the same thing in another thread. :-)

  • Annapolis2

    Congress and the TSA are fully aware that cargo which no one has ever inspected is riding in the hold of passenger planes. Many of us have tried for years to sound the alarm – I’ve written to, called, and even visited the offices of dozens of Congressional representatives who sit on the relevant committees. No one wants to admit that the emperor has no clothes, because the scanner-sales and jobs-for-the-otherwise-unemployable lobbies need the cash flowing in from the TSA farce. But you need to know, as someone who flies and feels afraid of terrorism, that perimeter security is a joke, that the insider threat is being ignored, that airport employee background checks are being skipped, that YouTube is filled with evidence of shockingly easy exploits to sneak any metallic or non-metallic item through a body scanner, and that overseas cargo is not systematically searched or checked before it flies on your plane.

    The emperor has no clothes. TSA kabuki theater and the dance of the shoeless idiots might make you feel safe, but it’s obvious to even a casual observer that checkpoint searches can do nothing to actually increase security.

  • Annapolis2

    Congress and the TSA are fully aware that cargo which no one has ever inspected is riding in the hold of passenger planes. Many of us have tried for years to sound the alarm – I’ve written to, called, and even visited the offices of dozens of Congressional representatives who sit on the relevant committees. No one wants to admit that the emperor has no clothes, because the scanner-sales and jobs-for-the-otherwise-unemployable lobbies need the cash flowing in from the TSA farce. But you need to know, as someone who flies and feels afraid of terrorism, that perimeter security is a joke, that the insider threat is being ignored, that airport employee background checks are being skipped, that YouTube is filled with evidence of shockingly easy exploits to sneak any metallic or non-metallic item through a body scanner, and that overseas cargo is not systematically searched or checked before it flies on your plane.

    The emperor has no clothes. TSA kabuki theater and the dance of the shoeless idiots might make you feel safe, but it’s obvious to even a casual observer that checkpoint searches can do nothing to actually increase security.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    I guess I hit a nerve, didn’t I?

    Look, Sparky, it’s painfully obvious that you have no idea what steps I’ve taken to mitigate this threat. Your shockingly inappropriate ad hominem personal attack was cute, but off base, and wrong.

    Like Annapolis2 I have the opportunity to have these conversations. People don’t want to hear them. You know why? Because people like you bleat out, “Everything’s OK! Anything to keep me safe! I don’t see it, so it must be OK! Why don’t YOU do something about it?”

    You see luggage screened and have made a clear distinction between that and cargo.

    Bravo! You still don’t get the point.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    I guess I hit a nerve, didn’t I?

    Look, Sparky, it’s painfully obvious that you have no idea what steps I’ve taken to mitigate this threat. Your shockingly inappropriate ad hominem personal attack was cute, but off base, and wrong.

    Like Annapolis2 I have the opportunity to have these conversations. People don’t want to hear them. You know why? Because people like you bleat out, “Everything’s OK! Anything to keep me safe! I don’t see it, so it must be OK! Why don’t YOU do something about it?”

    You see luggage screened and have made a clear distinction between that and cargo.

    Bravo! You still don’t get the point.

  • SoBeSparky

    “Look, Sparky, it’s painfully obvious that you have no idea what steps I’ve taken to mitigate this threat.” Am I to interpret this to mean you are a powerful executive who has taken steps to mitigate threats? In addition to you being in the KNOW?

    You claim to “KNOW what’s going on,” (your own words with your capital letters). You now claim I have no idea the steps you have taken to mitigate threats.

    Accept your moral responsibilities then, or face ridicule as another anonymous chicken-little type. In fact, if you have knowledge of specific threats and keep silent, you might be as liable as the terrorists involved.

    The internet has bred all these blogs and anonymous posters with absolutely certain, irrefutable “knowledge.” This “knowledge” is simply worthless without attributions by name and source. All other claims are mere passing pixels in the ether.

    That, Mr. TSAisTerrorism, is the point.

  • SoBeSparky

    “Look, Sparky, it’s painfully obvious that you have no idea what steps I’ve taken to mitigate this threat.” Am I to interpret this to mean you are a powerful executive who has taken steps to mitigate threats? In addition to you being in the KNOW?

    You claim to “KNOW what’s going on,” (your own words with your capital letters). You now claim I have no idea the steps you have taken to mitigate threats.

    Accept your moral responsibilities then, or face ridicule as another anonymous chicken-little type. In fact, if you have knowledge of specific threats and keep silent, you might be as liable as the terrorists involved.

    The internet has bred all these blogs and anonymous posters with absolutely certain, irrefutable “knowledge.” This “knowledge” is simply worthless without attributions by name and source. All other claims are mere passing pixels in the ether.

    That, Mr. TSAisTerrorism, is the point.

  • SoBeSparky

    There is a significant difference between the words “inspected” and “screened.” No one claims all cargo is physically inspected. No one claims overseas cargo is systematically searched.

    As for it being “checked,” the word itself is vague. What I might consider “checked” and what you might consider the same could be vastly different.

    Screening systems are in place for passengers, luggage and cargo. A system relies on several components, not just one step. A checkpoint is a step in a system, not the system itself.

    While many mock the anecdotal instances where one step of a system appears to fail, they fail to examine the many successes of that step. Most posters here try to discredit the entire system by citing anecdotal failures of a step. Humans are not omniscient and machines do not operate for infinite periods with no failures. Those are “givens” in any system analysis.

    Those who mock the system cannot fathom that it has made airplane terrorism far more difficult. They do not understand the deterrent and substitution effects. First, terrorists can recognize it is far more difficult to go undetected. Second, they find other methods of terrorism to substitute for air transport terrorism. The objective of this terrorism is not to create more business for airplane manufacturers by bring down aircraft. The objective is to create fear, demoralize, and damage economically. Cyber-terrorism, for example, might prove far more fruitful with less effort than trying to battle international air transport terrorism-prevention efforts.

    There is another way to evaluate the entire air security system. That is, what are the results? As no system is completely foolproof, there will be airplane terrorist attacks in the future. The question is whether or not that risk is being minimized.

    Insurance companies undertake risk management on behalf of clients. The companies never promise 100% success. But they can show before-and-after comparisons where the risk management efforts have substantially improved the outcomes. The TSA has a pretty good story in tell in outcomes.

    What we should demand is that a process of continuous improvement is in place to minimize risks through a systematic approach to air transport safety, and terrorism in particular.

  • SoBeSparky

    There is a significant difference between the words “inspected” and “screened.” No one claims all cargo is physically inspected. No one claims overseas cargo is systematically searched.

    As for it being “checked,” the word itself is vague. What I might consider “checked” and what you might consider the same could be vastly different.

    Screening systems are in place for passengers, luggage and cargo. A system relies on several components, not just one step. A checkpoint is a step in a system, not the system itself.

    While many mock the anecdotal instances where one step of a system appears to fail, they fail to examine the many successes of that step. Most posters here try to discredit the entire system by citing anecdotal failures of a step. Humans are not omniscient and machines do not operate for infinite periods with no failures. Those are “givens” in any system analysis.

    Those who mock the system cannot fathom that it has made airplane terrorism far more difficult. They do not understand the deterrent and substitution effects. First, terrorists can recognize it is far more difficult to go undetected. Second, they find other methods of terrorism to substitute for air transport terrorism. The objective of this terrorism is not to create more business for airplane manufacturers by bring down aircraft. The objective is to create fear, demoralize, and damage economically. Cyber-terrorism, for example, might prove far more fruitful with less effort than trying to battle international air transport terrorism-prevention efforts.

    There is another way to evaluate the entire air security system. That is, what are the results? As no system is completely foolproof, there will be airplane terrorist attacks in the future. The question is whether or not that risk is being minimized.

    Insurance companies undertake risk management on behalf of clients. The companies never promise 100% success. But they can show before-and-after comparisons where the risk management efforts have substantially improved the outcomes. The TSA has a pretty good story in tell in outcomes.

    What we should demand is that a process of continuous improvement is in place to minimize risks through a systematic approach to air transport safety, and terrorism in particular.

  • Annapolis2

    But terrorist attacks are unfathomably rare events, and as such, there can be no scientific approach to answer “whether or not that risk is being minimized.” Have you read The Black Swan? Bruce Schneier is a security expert who points out that while the number of security steps we can take are finite and limited, the number of potential targets and potential plots is infinite. We can stop stupid terrorists, and we won’t succeed at stopping smart ones. His take (and mine) on the TSA and all of its nonsense is “This is a foolish game, and we should stop playing it.”

  • Annapolis2

    But terrorist attacks are unfathomably rare events (Have you read The Black Swan?), and as such, there can be no scientific approach to answer “whether or not that risk is being minimized.” As just one example, take Behavior Detection Officers. Are these a good use of our resources? No one knows, because we can never, for obvious reasons, conduct a controlled experiment to see whether training can help people identify suicidal maniacs. However, we know that even the best performers at lie detection don’t do much better than chance (see http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10683160108401791, http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/lhb/24/6/643/), so that, as with polygraphs, far more truthful people will be falsely incriminated than liars caught. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673686908950 Thus, the base rate fallacy will catch you out if you try to apply BDOs to an airport full of people (http://www.forbes.com/2007/03/23/terrorism-security-database-tech-security-cx_bs_0326security.html). It just can’t work, not even in theory. And of course, in practice we know that behavior detection officers failed to detect 16 known terrorists who passed through their airports on at least 23 separate occasions, according to a GAO report. (page 51 of http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304510.pdf) It’s not just me saying the emperor has no clothes. Pay attention: it won’t work, it can’t work, it doesn’t work. TSA is fiction.

    Bruce Schneier is a security expert who points out that while the number of security steps we can take are finite and limited, the number of potential targets and potential plots is infinite. We can stop stupid terrorists, and we won’t succeed at stopping smart ones. His take (and mine) on the TSA and all of its nonsense is “This is a foolish game, and we should stop playing it.”

  • PsyGuy

    So where is our “School Safety Administration”? It’s been how long since Columbine, and Sandy Brook just happened, and nothing really changed between those two events

  • PsyGuy

    So where is our “School Safety Administration”? It’s been how long since Columbine, and Sandy Brook just happened, and nothing really changed between those two events

  • Andrew Phillips

    As someone with PreCheck access (it’s a perk of NEXUS) I admit, I do get a kick out of skipping the 20 minute+ lines and walking thru security onto a plane. It’s even better in Canada where I can clear customs and security in less than 5 minutes…

    The main difference between myself and most passengers, I paid $50 and had a basic screening interview/background check. Nothing extreme at all.

    Is it a matter of user pay for priority

  • Andrew Phillips

    As someone with PreCheck access (it’s a perk of NEXUS) I admit, I do get a kick out of skipping the 20 minute+ lines and walking thru security onto a plane. It’s even better in Canada where I can clear customs and security in less than 5 minutes…

    The main difference between myself and most passengers, I paid $50 and had a basic screening interview/background check. Nothing extreme at all.

    Is it a matter of user pay for priority