How many more TSA screening failures can we afford?

If Jon Corbett’s viral video about how he outsmarted the TSA’s full-body scanners doesn’t end the controversial screening program, then it’s probably the beginning of the end.

And when the agency charged with protecting America’s transportation systems unplugs the last scanner and wheels it out of the airport terminal, TSA will have to answer to the American taxpayers about its latest failure.

Well, maybe.

The TSA is about halfway through deploying 1,800 scanners at a cost of about $170,000 per unit. The total pricetag of the program — $289 million — may not seem like a lot in these days of trillion-dollar trade deficits. But when you factor in the $2.4 billion in extra staffing costs over the seven-year life cycle of the machines the Government Accountability Office says the agency will have to cover, it all adds up.

Corbett, a 27-year-old technology entrepreneur from Miami Beach, Fla., says he wants to end the TSA’s scans and pat-downs in favor of more effective, non-invasive methods. He foiled the machines by simply turning to his side and exploiting a blind spot on the scanners.

Yep, that’s all it took. Terrorists take note.

TSA dismissed the video as “a crude attempt to allegedly show how to circumvent TSA screening procedures.” But it also didn’t say he was wrong, which led many observers to conclude that Corbett was correct.

This is hardly the first screening technology breakdown for the TSA. In 2009, the agency quietly killed its bomb-sniffing “puffer” machines, which had cost $36 million. Dirt and humidity in airports reportedly led to frequent breakdowns of the devices, but even more embarrassing to the TSA is the fact that the puffers didn’t catch a single terrorist. They just puffed away, blowing air at passengers until finally breathing their last gasp.

Did anyone have to answer for this waste of our money? Not really. This transcript of a 2010 hearing of a House science subcommittee is more or less the extent of what’s publicly known, and while there’s a feisty exchange between Oregon Rep. David Wu and a government researcher, it amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist.

Of course, the TSA’s screening failures haven’t just been on the tech side, but let’s stay there for a second. In 2006, TSA banned all but small amounts of liquids and gels from being brought on board, but promised it would lift the restrictions once it could safely scan your Starbucks latte. And even though it says its deployed hundreds of so-called Bottled Liquid Scanners, the ban remains.

This is a failure of another kind — a failure to perform — and its costs are not as easy to estimate. How many pricey shampoos, lotions and drinks have been unceremoniously tossed into a checkpoint trashcan because the TSA can’t get its act together? Who knows.

And let’s not forget the screening performance failures, which could be the costliest of all. Like missing the deadline for screening cargo on international flights.

Or missing a deadly weapon or two at the airport. Not a day seems to go by without hearing a story about passengers slipping through TSA’s vaunted 20-layer security process with contraband. Here’s a woman who boarded a plane with a firearm in her purse. Here’s a large knife that got through security in Myrtle Beach, S.C. Here’s a sword.

C-4, anyone?

Fortunately, none of these passengers had nefarious intentions. But what if they did?

We could spend billions more experimenting with the latest unproven technology, whether it’s a new body scanner or explosive detection gadget. We could fret about the knives, stun-guns and grenades that were caught by TSA screeners, as the agency does every week on its blog — or the ones that got through, which it never seems to mention. That, in turn, can be used to justify the TSA’s bloated budget.

But at what point should we say, “Enough is enough?” Magnetometers, dogs and well-trained screeners work just fine, thanks very much.

Insurance companies must make these difficult decisions every day. They have to run a cost-benefit analysis on patients and either say, “Yes, we’ll cover the treatment,” or, “No, we won’t.” It’s particularly agonizing for someone with a chronic or terminal illness, hearing an insurance company representative essentially say your life has monetary value. But if they didn’t tell you, it would probably be up to a government bureaucrat.

Here we are in a similar situation. We have to ask: What’s a passenger’s life worth?

Answer that question, and knowing what to do next will be a little easier.

Do we throw a billion dollars at yet another iffy gadget that some say invades our privacy? Or do we say “no” to what many consider just another expensive prop for America’s security theater?

Do we continue offering this agency a blank check — or do we pull it back, maybe privatize airport security, and agree that TSA will never be anything other than an expensive deterrent to terrorist attacks?

  • Chasmosaur

    I’m sarcastic because you called Jeffrey Goldberg’s 2008 Atlantic article – where he demonstrated how easy it was at that time for a person to print out a fake boarding pass on their own computer, and get through a TSA checkpoint using that and no picture ID – a “cute article on the Internet”.  I was responding to your perceived sarcasm. 

    In order to change the state of transportation security, one of the things we need as a society is for TSA’s failings need to be exposed by reputable media.  Like The Atlantic. Because TSA and DHS absolutely will NOT do it on their own.

    And as for “private rent-a-cops”?  Stop the hyperbole. Before TSA, airport security may have been private and chosen by individual airport authorities, but they were under FAA oversight.  So instead of federal employees, they were basically federal contractors.  And I’m guessing they probably had to jump through many more hoops and provide far more qualified employees than the current crop of TSO’s.  Who can respond to ads placed on pizza boxes. http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/07/tsa_using_pizza_boxes_to_recru.html

    (And a point in fact?  The box cutters used by the 9/11 terrorists were totally legit to carry before then.  Private security didn’t fail – they let through a permitted personal item that wasn’t considered dangerous.)

    The problem is – as I stated in my original reply – the state of US Intelligence/Security/Law Enforcement.  I have a few friends in various levels of the involved federal agencies, and they say the same – that no one wants to share info, and it creates large gaps.  To use a non-TSA example to illustrate the holes in our national security and border patrol policy, all you have to do is google “Andrew Speaker”.

    Large security issues simply cannot be stopped by federally funded pizza box rent-a-cops. Once someone willing to cross a border or board a plane is in a position to do so (and willing to die for the cause of it), they will find a way.  So you need to stop them BEFORE they get to the airport.

    The rest is, indeed, security theater, whether it’s TSO’s or private firms.  The authors of the theater are in DC (or probably Arlington, who knows right now) – and those guys are much harder to disenfranchise.

  • Jonathan Corbett

    Thanks for covering, Chris!  A few responses to the commenters:

    1) The nude body scanners are no longer a deterrant (assuming they ever were).  You can literally get anything — firearm, knives, explosives, or just a flask of your favorite scotch — through the body scanners now.  But, even before my video, everyone knew a determined person could hide anything they want in a body cavity.  Do you really think someone who’s about to kill themselves with a suicide bomb has a problem with storing something in their ass?  Prisoners do it daily.  The fact of the matter is that with any of the above techniques, or any other techniques of which I’m aware, you can’t get a gun through a metal detector.  The body scanners are a step back for security, not forward.

    2) You can’t logistically fix the problem simply by taking a side image.  You would end up taking twice as long to screen every passenger (Want to double staff from 60K to 120K?  Buy twice as many scanners?), subject every passenger to twice the radiation dose, and have twice the opportunity for false positives.  Current false positive rate is about 40%, and new false positive rate would be 64%.  At that rate, two-thirds of passengers are getting a pat-down anyway.  Might as well just give everyone a pat-down.

    3) Regarding privatizing, here’s where I’m coming from.  First, I know that privatizing security means that if there is a problem, I can vote with my money.  An airline decides to have abusive screeners?  Fly another airline that cares.  Second, I do believe (and as best I know, there is little argument showing otherwise) that we can do private security for less money than government security.  Third, as a political preference, I prefer my government to be as small as possible.  A 60,000 employee agency to secure airports is absolutely absurd, and ends up being full of waste (see point #2).  Fourth, in having sued the TSA, I can tell you that they hide behind immunity that is only availabe to the government, whereas private companies would be more easily brought to justice for abuse.

    –Jon

  • Jonathan Corbett

    Thanks for covering, Chris!  A few responses to the commenters:

    1) The nude body scanners are no longer a deterrant (assuming they ever were).  You can literally get anything — firearm, knives, explosives, or just a flask of your favorite scotch — through the body scanners now.  But, even before my video, everyone knew a determined person could hide anything they want in a body cavity.  Do you really think someone who’s about to kill themselves with a suicide bomb has a problem with storing something in their ass?  Prisoners do it daily.  The fact of the matter is that with any of the above techniques, or any other techniques of which I’m aware, you can’t get a gun through a metal detector.  The body scanners are a step back for security, not forward.

    2) You can’t logistically fix the problem simply by taking a side image.  You would end up taking twice as long to screen every passenger (Want to double staff from 60K to 120K?  Buy twice as many scanners?), subject every passenger to twice the radiation dose, and have twice the opportunity for false positives.  Current false positive rate is about 40%, and new false positive rate would be 64%.  At that rate, two-thirds of passengers are getting a pat-down anyway.  Might as well just give everyone a pat-down.

    3) Regarding privatizing, here’s where I’m coming from.  First, I know that privatizing security means that if there is a problem, I can vote with my money.  An airline decides to have abusive screeners?  Fly another airline that cares.  Second, I do believe (and as best I know, there is little argument showing otherwise) that we can do private security for less money than government security.  Third, as a political preference, I prefer my government to be as small as possible.  A 60,000 employee agency to secure airports is absolutely absurd, and ends up being full of waste (see point #2).  Fourth, in having sued the TSA, I can tell you that they hide behind immunity that is only availabe to the government, whereas private companies would be more easily brought to justice for abuse.

    –Jon

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    +1

  • http://www.facebook.com/sommer.gentry Sommer Gentry

    Here’s one: the TSA should stop relying on security by obscurity.  Hiding the flaws in one’s security setup makes the system far less secure than revealing them does!  Only when every aspect of every security measure the TSA employs is 100% transparent to the public will we be able to assure ourselves that the system has value. 

    This is how computer security works: the most secure systems are the open ones, because they’ve withstood lots of testing.  If you’re hoping to stay safe because you think no one knows how easy it is to break your system, that’s when you’re in the most danger.

    Stop keeping secrets!  In particular, the fact that the screening procedures are hidden from passengers creates an unacceptable power differential in which passengers can’t protect themselves from screeners’ mistakes or screeners’ malicious abuse.  As things are now, passengers must give a blank check to the TSA to do anything and everything to our bodies and our belongings, because the TSA won’t tell us what we’re consenting to but they say we can’t withdraw from screening.

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    Its too late.  If you are anything other than 100 percent anti-TSA you are a TSA apologist who has surrendered your rights. 

  • http://www.facebook.com/sommer.gentry Sommer Gentry

    To be fair, some of us did respond in the spirit in which you posted.  You seemed to be genuinely curious about why people are upset and want to end the TSA.  I tried to answer the question from my perspective.

  • http://elliott.org Christopher Elliott

    I would hope that we can be respectful of each others’ opinions on this site. I wouldn’t consider myself “pro” or “anti” TSA — I’m just a skeptic who loves tabloid headlines and oversimplified polls.

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    You really cannot recall A TSA agent a friendly or polite. I am amazed as the overwhelming majority of agents I meet are friendly and polite.  Perhaps its airport dependent.

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    Jeanne

    As one of the few posters who is not anti-TSA I want to thank you for your kind remarks to lockkng1.

  • SoBeSparky

    There is nothing “external” about Corbett’s advocacy in his video, wanting to put our national security in the hands of the same capitalist mindsets who brought us the mortgage meltdown, the bank bailout, and imposition of consumer bank fees to pay for the sins of their investment banking and commercial mortgage businesses.  As long as the rent-a-cops #1 priority is return on investment to shareholders, we know where their ultimate loyalties lay. 

    Technologies are far different today than pre-9/11.  Machines which work will be needed.  Who develops them?  At what cost?  The military-industrial-complex will save us again?  You can preach trashing the TSA, but you must have a better model for national transportation security than has been suggested so far.  Or perhaps you just want to let open the security gates at the airports and declare laissez faire.  The market system will self regulate.  No more government interference.  

  • AgentSteve

    I would agree that “locality” of TSA employees might make a bit of a difference; however, my experiences have been less than favorable.  I have found that most have a “power” attitude and are condescending.  The stages involved with flying continue to become more and more challenging; getting through TSA is the most anxious aspect of all.

  • Thak Ferimatten

    We’ve paid billions and billions of dollars to those jackasses to figure out a solution that does a reasonably good job while not degrading and demeaning passengers, nor depriving them of their rights and dignity. Strip searching people and feeling their private parts is not what we pay these people money for.  Those kinds of solutions are wrong and illegal from the get-go.

    I don’t have to figure out a solution. That is their job. they’ve figured out a non-solution.

  • SoBeSparky

    “Vote with my money” is a horrid thought and absurd solution if there is a “lapse” and a terrorism incident occurs in the air.

    It is a long established public purpose of government to handle law enforcement and security, going back to the militia before the Revolutionary War.  It was the Brits, you might recall, who hired the mercenaries and privatized the Revolutionary War for their side.

    When it comes down to a private security manager choosing between additional profit/bonus and additional security, what is the decision made by a profit-driven contractor?  Human greed is the normal condition, not some aberration, as proven over and over in history.  That is why capitalism, as a natural system, works so well.

    Also, the “solution” of trashing the TSA does not address who develops the mechanization necessary to process people effectively and efficiently in protecting our transportation systems.  We have absolutely no reason to suspect better results from the private security machinery sector than when they develop under-performing and over-cost military systems today.  There is no easy answer.

    The same smaller-government-is-better people are crying for the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act while those pensioners (and those who were soon-to-be) lost billions of dollars in the aggregate and are living hand to mouth.  How can memories be so short as to what happens when the profit motive gets in the way of an altruistic objective, such as protection of retirement capital for the elderly?  In the 2000s the retirement funds were invested in AAA safe investments, only to find that greed and capitalism reduced these bonds to mere waste paper.  

    Apparently, these small government people cannot even remember four or five years back as to how so many lost so much through no fault of their own.  They no longer can “vote with my money” as they have none.

    And people who take public transport and who suffer from a lapse in security administered by private for-profit firms cannot vote with anything.  They are vaporized.

    Capitalism does not self-regulate when we are protecting our people and our country.  It is the responsibility of the people’s government, always has been and always should be.  It cannot be delegated.

  • Thak Ferimatten

    So, before we can criticize, we must provide a better model that TSA’s come up with?  Let’s extend that reasoning to objections to jailers beating inmates in prison. We have to come up with a better way to do jail security before we can object to such inhuman and illegal behavior?

    Obviously not. Obviously we don’t have to solve the whole jail security ssue before demanding that such beatings cease immediately.  What’s wrong is simply wrong. Strip searching people and feeling up their private areas without cause is simply wrong. Stop the damage and do something else. It’s YOUR JOB, TSA, to come up with something that doesn’t p*ss off everyone subjected to it.

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    SoBeSparky, Yes. I’ll repeat what I’ve said so many times in the past:  

    Police work. Intelligence. The same things that have always been used to fight crime.

    The work that has to be done to nab actual terrorists (as opposed to sad sacks, disaffected loners, and the mentally ill) has to be done way, way before he/she gets to an airport. 

    Bullying, stripping, and groping people isn’t making us any safer.  It’s just bullying, stripping, and groping. Confiscating scary scissors, terrifying tweezers, contraband cupcakes, insulin, and breast milk isn’t making anybody any safer.

    And again, nobody was getting scanned and pawed before the Reign of Molestation was implemented in 2010, yet planes weren’t dropping out of the sky left and right.

    Obviously, somebody could kill a lot more people just by detonating an explosive in the checkpoint line itself. Or in a concourse à la Moscow’s Domodedovo. Or in the parking garage. Or at the curb. Do we scan and paw everyone  at the entrance? On the ramp leading from the highway to the airport? Where does it stop?

  • Thak Ferimatten

    I could care less about the money.  I care a great deal that I must submit to some trogolodyte goon of a human being demanding that I be seen without my clothing (backscatter AIT) or let him caress my buttocks and genitals.  That isn’t passenger screening, that is a prison intake process that NONE of us have merited by our conduct. We haven’t broken the law.

  • TonyA_says

    The problem is your logic is it’s also faulty because it only looks at one side of the coin. Your assumption is screening will deter would be bombers. The problem is two fold:
    (1) Screening also deters would be travelers – innocent people.
    (2) Real bombers who are willing to offer their lives are probably smarter than the TSA and will find a way to harm us in more ways that we can think about.

    I’m particular concerned with the first problem – the hassling of  millions of innocent passengers. My proposed solution is to simply go back to the pre-911 airport security. The cockpit doors are secured and all Americans I know are willing to duke it out with any terrorist or misfit on board an aircraft.

    Solving the second problem needs good intelligence and a vigilant public. I suppose the CIA, FBI and local law enforcement is a lot better in doing this job than the TSA.

    Finally, for Pete’s sake, the shoe and underwear bombers were foreigner “losers” in real life. The easiest way to prevent the problem, is not to issue visas to losers and to prevent them from coming here (even if they are from non-visa countries).

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    Most are, some are not.

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    It is truly amazing how different people have different experiences.  My experiences with TSA across the country has been mostly excellent.  As recently as Wednesday at LAX, the x-ray machine broke.  The TSA agents scrambled to get the bags scanned at a different machine while we went through the metal detector at the original machine

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_OEPJGQPIEB75YYDE5CJY6R3VFE Carver Clark Farrow II

    Sommer,

    You are always gracious in your posts and responses.  It is greatly appreciated.

  • mike gordon

    $200,000 times 600 scanners = $120 million. This is still a lot of money, although maybe not for the federal government. But it is 10 percent of $1.2 billion.

  • http://elliott.org Christopher Elliott

    You’re right. I was linking to another blog, which had the information wrong. I’ve revised the paragraph and am now linking to a GAO study.

  • http://profiles.google.com/ron.bonner R B

    Just out of personal curiosity do you have any ties to government, DHS or TSA?

  • Jonathan Corbett

    There’s more cost beyond the cost of the device.  Think training, staffing, and Blogger Bob’s salary. ;)

  • http://elliott.org Christopher Elliott

    True, and so noted. But Blogger Bob is worth every penny the TSA pays him. ;-) And I know you’re reading this, Bob. Don’t worry, your job is safe.

  • http://www.facebook.com/susan.j.barretta Susan J. Barretta

    Jon Corbett’s experiment validated the opinions reflected in a two year old article in the UK Telegraph 3-Jan-2010 by Jane Merrick: 

    “Are planned airport scanners just a scam? New technology that Gordon Brown relies on for his response to the Christmas Day bomb attack has been tested – and found wanting”

    http://tinyurl.com/uktelegraph-2010-scanner-scam

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    SoBeSparky, for the record, I’m a longtime lefty. I’m not a “smaller government is always better” person. Frankly, I’d describe myself as a socialist. I believe that, without some checks, capitalism eats everyone and everything alive.

    I’d like to see something for my tax dollars, including public transportation, financial regulatory oversight, environmental protection, etc.

    But I don’t want to see money wasted on abusive garbage like the TSA. And I don’t want to see our civil liberties shredded. 

    We have repeated over and over the fact that planes weren’t being blown out of the sky left and right with the old, ordinary methods of walk-through metal-detector and occasional wanding.  We don’t need bullying, intimidating, stripping, pawing, and groping to be safe.

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    As the famous experiments of Philip Zimbardo and Stanley Milgram demonstrated over 40 years ago, people put in positions of unlimited power will abuse that power. It’s not a question of “if,” it’s a question of “when.”

  • TSAisTerrorism

    An unreported figure is the retrofits the airports have to undergo to make room for these monstrous, ineffective pieces of junk. 

    I don’t have the figure handy, but some airports are each spending around a million each just to relocate merchants and centralize checkpoints so the TSA has room for these fancy new contraptions. Those numbers drastically inflate the cost of this junk, and obviously the TSA would rather that data not be known.

  • TSAisTerrorism

    And Jon’s experiment only exploited one of the many known weaknesses in this method of screening. TSA’s response appears to be to do a post-scan groping of all scanees. How cute. They’re still missing other obvious holes.

  • Joe_D_Messina

    I don’t know if they’re overspending but I’m certain they’re spending the money on the wrong things. The problem with huge bureaucracies like the TSA and even our Congress is they don’t function with any common sense. Find a handful of security experts and tell them to defend an airport like their families would be traveling through their on a regular basis and we’d have a much more secure situation without any of the useless hassles of the TSA.

  • Chasmosaur

    SoBeSparky asked for constructive fixes to the problems – here’s my take on it:

    While I don’t think the concept of DHS was a bad idea, it’s been poorly executed.  If they were trying to make something equivalent to the UK’s Home Office, they failed, since that includes the equivalent of US agencies like the FBI, DEA and US Marshals. The US intelligence community is also inefficient and producing so much information that it can’t all be reviewed.  (See - http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ )

    So the first thing that needs to happen is a hard look at DHS, Law Enforcement and Intelligence.  The Intelligence community alone is far too spread out – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Intelligence_Community#Members

    Communication is grossly inefficient, and systems that are supposed to be integrated simply aren’t.  (Again, as I stated somewhere earlier, the “Underwear” bomber was on DNI’s “watch list”, but that information never made to the FBI, who maintains the “no-fly” and “selectee” list that are supposed to check airline ticket purchases.)  Once you have intelligence being shared productively, then there’s a better chance terrorists can be stopped before they even get to the airport, which is the ideal situation.

    That, however, is a larger issue.  When it comes to TSA?  I think that it should go to USDOT.  The FAA had oversight over US airport security previous to TSA – so they didn’t hire, but they did issue guidelines for the security that airport authorities could not over-ride.  Before 9/11, they actually did a decent job – hijackings originating from US soil had become non-existent since the 1980′s.  And the box-cutters that the 9/11 hijackers used?  Those were allowed, so there was no failure.  (Remember, first class actually had cutlery back in the day – a box cutter could be used to equal effect as a knife capable of cutting meat.)

    The failure there was in intelligence, not logistics/operations. Remember, there had been intelligence that Middle Eastern terror groups were planning on a major act of sabotage involving a plane for several years.  The powers-that-were decided that it was ludicrous or too far off into the future, so no immediate action was taken.  (They were thinking that the pilot training systems in their home countries weren’t advanced enough, and that it would be a traditional hijacking, where the passengers were hostages, not part of the damage to be inflicted.)  If the FAA never knew about these (I can’t remember if they did), then how could airport security or airlines adjust their own security appropriately?

    So I think Transportation Security should go to USDOT oversight, with airport security staffing to be a mix of actual LEO’s and better trained screeners who meet more than a “can you stand on your feet and lift heavy bags?” as a qualification.  And they should receive a briefing on transportation-related security that would allow them to provide adequate security that allows for a balance freedom of movement, security screening and no 4th Amendment violations.

    They also would have to follow government procedure and go through a public comment period before adding things like AIT. Because if they reside outside of the intelligence community, then they can’t hide behind “national security” to force things on the traveling public.  And the public can then decide whether or not they think things like pat-downs and AIT are necessary to the regular screening process.

    USDOT actually has a vested interest in keeping transportation moving and safe.  I sometimes think DHS would be happy if no one traveled at all.  It would certainly make their job easier, as they prefer to obstruct, not protect.  So give transportation security operations to the people who are actually experts in transportation.

    Oh – and seriously?  Have a Disney consult.  They know how to move huge amounts of people efficiently and politely.  I’m not saying we need characters at the checkpoints, but there has to be a better way to sort people. ;)

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    Engineer and statistical analyst Bill Fisher crunched the numbers here:

    http://tsanewsblog.com/1847/news/time-for-a-rational-perspective-on-airport-scanners/

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    I’m going to repeat what I’ve said so many times:  enough with the shibboleth about Israeli security. Bombs still go off in Israel, just not on planes.

    Buses, cafes, marketplaces — bombs still go off there. The Israelis have learned to accept that risk. They don’t expect 100% security, because 100% security is a fantasy.  A childish, dangerous fantasy.

    The fact that so many Americans believe this fantasy is why they’re willing to bend over and spread ‘em every time an authority figure tells them to.

    Again, you’re more likely to be killed in a car accident — 35,000 traffic fatalities every year in this country — than to be killed in a terrorist attack.  

    Enough already with the fear-mongering. Flying is still far, far safer than driving. And more people are driving to avoid the TSA. Which means more people are dying because of the TSA.

    The TSA not only isn’t doing sh*t at the airport to keep us safe. It’s actually causing more people to die. Mathematician Sommer Gentry has done the statistical analysis:

    http://tsanewsblog.com/1747/news/tsas-procedures-dont-make-anyone-safer/

  • http://profiles.google.com/bmgraham Barry Graham

    Thanks for releasing this video.  I trust in G-d not the TSA.

  • Carchar

    So, what you are telling me is that Israeli aviation security is a waste of time. Except that Israeli agents CAN point out times when they’ve prevented terrorists from going on planes. 

    I happen to disagree with you about Israeli-type security, having experienced it several times, even in times of war. They have several respectful “conversations” with every passenger. Their security agents are intelligent and very well trained. They screen every piece of baggage, but they don’t feel the need to resort to x-rated methods to do their jobs. No one seems to think the Israeli government is fear-mongering. 

    Do they take homicide bombers in stride? Yes. It is a way of life for them, but that doesn’t mean they shouldn’t try to prevent more deaths.

    I don’t see why their methods can’t work for us. 

  • TonyA_says

    You just said why – they recruit (or draft)  intelligent people.

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    Carchar, no, I didn’t say that Israeli aviation security is a waste of time. I said bombs still go off in Israel.  And that there’s no such thing as 100% security, which Americans want to believe in.

    Furthermore, Israeli security works great if you’re the “right” kind of person. They rely heavily on racial and ethnic profiling. If you’re an American with a tour group, you’ll be ushered quickly through. If you’re the “wrong” racial or ethnic type, you’ll get a thorough going-over.  And if you’re a peace activist, forget it — you’ll get strip-searched in a back room. Just ask Holocaust survivor Hedy Epstein:

    http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/05/holocaust-survivor-hedy-epstein-aipac-does-not-speak-for-me/    

  • http://tsanewsblog.com/214/news/history-repeats-itself-with-tsas-strip-search-tactics/ Lisa Simeone

    See comments on Israeli security further down-thread.

  • cjr001

    TSA’s track record speaks for itself.

  • http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=500222631 Reuven Avram

    Every extra screener is a security risk. As an Israeli who lives in the United States, I’d rather have the model of a smaller number of very highly trained people. They don’t make me take off my belt and shoes at Ben Gurion airport; I get a magnetometer, often a sniff from a dog, and a little 3-minute interview from someone who’s actually intelligent.

    TSA agents can be bribed for $200, as this story at Shiny Badge shows: http://shinybadge.com/2012/03/philly-tsa-instructor-took-bribes-200-gets-a-passing-grade-on-certification-exam/

  • http://twitter.com/elegant_erica Erica

    Any update?